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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

-v-

Case No. 17610

DAVID ALLEN PATTERSON,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant was charged with forgery in violation of
Utah Code Ann.,§ 76-6-SOl(l){b)

(1978) in the Fourth Judicial

District Court in and for Utah County, the Honorable Allen B.
Sorenson, Judge, presiding.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Appellant was tried before a jury and was found
g11il ty of one count oi: forgery o:i February 11, 1981.

On

February 27, 1981 the trial court sentenced appellant to an
indeterminate term of not less then one year nor more than
fifteen years.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Res9ondent seeks a judgment and order of this Court
affir~ing

the jury verdict and sentence of the lower court.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
On November 20, 1980,

appellant, David Allen

Patterson, and James Matheos drove to Morris Motors in Provo,
Utah,

to rent a car (T.

91).

James Matheos, originally a co-

defendant and later a witness for the prosecution in the case,
was appellant's friend and had lived next door to appellant's
brother, Carl Patterson (T. 87).
rental agreement,
a.m.

(T. 30).

According to the written

appellant signed for the car at about 10:20

Matheos, however, testified that the two rentei

the car at 8:30 or 9:00 a.m. at the latest.

Originally,

Matheos attempted to rent the car, but was unsuccessful (T.

69, 76).

Appellant then represented himself to be, and used

the

identification of,

"Micah Roy Woodward" to rent the car

(T.

29, 30, 69, 108).

Woodward,

the true owner of the

driver's license and identification, testified that he had
lost the license and identification earlier that year, and
t'.:lat he did not authorize appellant to use Woodward's name anc
identification or to represent himself to be l'Joodward (T. 81),
Appellant and
colored AMC Concord,

~atheos

drove the car, a copper-

to Springville, Utah (T. 30, 33, 76).

They reconnoitered several houses in the h,ills around Hobble
Creek Canyon (T. 70, 75).

The third of fourth house they

stopped at belonged to Mr. Leon Swenson (T. 71,

76).

By

coincidence, Mr. Swenson unexpectedly returned home about

10:15 or 11:00 a.m., shortly after appellant and Matheos
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arrived

(T.

36-38).

Mr. Swenson asked appellant what he was

looking for and appellant said he was looking for "Dale Dixon"
(T. 37).
residence,

e,

Informed that Dale Dixon did not live at that
the two left and drove east of the Canyon Road

toward the house of Mr. Stanley Burningham (T. 37, 70).
Appellant entered Mr. Burningham's home while
Matheos waited outside in the rented car (T. 70, 74-75).
Appellant returned to the car with some checks and savings

&

bonds belonging to Mr. Burningham (T. 71, 75).

Mr. Burningham

discovered and reported the theft later that afternoon (T.
46-49).

Following the burglary of the Burningham home,
appellant and Matheos drove to First Security Bank in
Springville, Utah,
(T. 72).

to cash one of the checks they had stolen

Appellant asked Matheos to write out the front of

the check and discussed the amount, $2,666.00, with him (T.
~

731.

),

pa:/a::ile to "Roy WoodVTard," and dated it (T. 72).
'c?e:-i::

~atheos

signed

Burni'1qha~'s

name to the check,

~ade

it

Appellant

irito the bank to cash t 11e check ( T. 73).
Inside the bank, appellant endorsed the check in the

teller's presence and presented it to be cashed (T. 50-51).
The teller noticed the signatures on the check were irregular
and consulted the bank manager (T.
check with appellant,
c':e~:

(T.

"l2-63).

In

59).

After discussing the

the bank manager refused to cash the
atte~~ting

to cash the forged check
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appellant represented himself to be "Roy Woodward" to both
Leslee Hansen, the bank teller, and Roger Williams, the bank
manager (T. 52, 62, 64-65).
Having failed to cash the forged check,

the pair

drove to a drive-in hamburger restaurant in Spanish Fork,
Utah, and disposed of the checkbook in a trash dumpster (T.
7 3).

The next day, Matheos assisted Detective Fox of the

Ut~

County Sheriff's Department in recovering the checkbook from
the dumpster ( T. 73, 83).

Fingerprints taken from the

checkbook matched appellant's (T. 119-125).
The written rental agreement indicated that
appellant and Matheos returned the renten car to Morris Motor:
about 1:30 that afternoon (T.

21, 30).

Matheos, however,

testified that they returned the car at 4:30 or 5:00 p.m. (T.
74).

The pair then left Morris Motors in appellant's Grand

Prix (T. 34).
Appellant's version of the events which occurred oo
November 20, 1980 was substantially different from the facts
presented above and was supported by

t~e

testimony of

appellant's mother, Kay Lue Patterson, his brother, Carl
Patterson, and his girlfriend, Judy Stubbs',

Many of the

contradictory statements of these witnesses are set out in thi
Statement of Facts in Appellant's Brief.

However, appella~

does not raise a claim of insufficiency of the evidence or an

this case.
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Appellant's claim arises from the cross-examination
o~

James Matheos at trial.

The trial judge sustained the

prosecution's objections to defense counsel's questions
directed to Matheos concerning the number and nature of
felonies matheos had previously been convicted of, and the
number of burglary charges the prosecution had agreed to
dis~iss

in exchange for Matheos'

(T. 77-78).

On appeal,

testimony in the instant case

appellant claims the trial court

thereby unduly restricted his right of cross-examination.
ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT UNDULY RESTRICT
APPELLANT'S RIGHT OF CROSS-EX~~INATION.
Appellant asserts that the trial court
unduly restricted the right of cross-examination afforded him
by Article I, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution and the
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States
constitution which assure the right of confrontation.
Specifically,

appellant was restricted in his cross-examina-

tion of James Matheos, a witness for the State, concerning the
number of felonies Matheos had previously been convicted of,
the nature of the felony(ies), and the number of currently
pending charges the State had agreed to dismiss if Matheos
testified

in the instant case.

The following is the pertinent

dialogue between appellant's counsel, Matheos and the trial
-5-
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judge:
Q.
What time did you do this burglary at
Mr. Burningha~'s residence?

A.
I believe it was 9:00--between 9:00
and l O: 00.
Q.

Could have been later?

A.

I don't know, sir.

I don't think so.

Q.
Have you ever been convicted of a
felony, Mr. Matheos?
A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

Where at?

A.

Virginia.

MR. WATSON:
THE COURT:

I

will object.

Sustained.

(By Mr. Carter) What was the nature of
the accusation you were convicted of?

Q.

MR. WATSON:

I object.

THE COURT:
Sustained.
His answer to the
first question may remain.

Q.

(By Mr. Carter) How Dany felonies have
you been convicted of?
MR. WATSON:

THE COURT:

I object.
Sustained.

Q,
(By Mr. Carter) Tell me about your
deal you made with Mr. Watson.
A.
Re just--when I first got pulled over
at American Fork I went down.
They asked
me, you know, about everything that went
on and I wouldn't say nothing.
And then I
(':'!'""'"''-:?

("l'Jt

;:in~

-I-,-.,

l -4

t-1.-.,-.,r;-i

0 1 ~-,~y"::!

j

·~(J

"T:

l:·lC>\'•

-6-
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Q.
How many burglaries is he going to
dismiss for your testimony?
MR. WATSON:

Your Honor, I object.

THE COURT:
Sustained.
I will have to
give you a caution, Mr. Carter.
MR. CARTER:
Your Honor, I would like to
make a proffer at this point.
(T. 77-78).

According to appellant, the object of the cross-

examination was to elicit evidence indicating

~atheos's

possible bias and motive for testifying as he had.
to be done,

in part, by requiring Matheos to

number and nature of the felony(ies)

c~-,1ulge

This was
the

for which he had been

convicted prior to his involvement in the instant case, and
also by disclosing to the jury the plea bargain the State had
made with Matheos.
Many cases have held that the extent of crossexa~ination

is a matter which rests in the sound discretion of

the trial judge.
(1978);

State v. Starks, Utah, 581 P.2d 1015, 1017

State v. Maestas, Utah,

S_tat_EO:_v . .J\.nderson,

564 P.2d 1386, 1388 (1977);

27 L'tah 2d 276, 495 P,2cl 804,

806 (1972).

The record does not disclose in detail the basis for the trial
court's decision, but does indicate that the trial judge
curtailed the cross-examination, in part, on the basis of Rule

-7-
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45, Utah Rules of Evidencel and the fact
bargain was already before the jury (T.
matters the

that the plea
76, 67-68).

The on~

jury was not directly informed of <'luring cross-

examination of Matheos were the number and nature of
felony( ies) he hal'l been convicted of.

Responc'lent agrees that

generally a threshhold inquiry into the number an<'l nature of
felony(ies) of which a witness has been convicted is allowed,
State v. Kazda, 14 Utah 2<'1 266,

382 l".2d 407, 409

(1963).

Under the facts and circumstances of this case, however,
neither the trial court's restriction of appellant's crossexamination pertaining to the number and nature of felony
convictions, nor the curtailment of the disclosure of the
details of the plea bargain ma<'le between the State and
Matheos, whether considered separately or together, requires
reversal of the unanimous guilty verdict.

lutah Rules of Evidence, Rule 45 provides:
Except as

in these rules otherwise
-iu<1r.~ Tl"lf?\! il'. 'r:is rlisc~~ti011
~xclude ~viden~e if he finds that its
probative value is substantially
outweighed by the risk that its admission
will (a) necessitate undue consumption of
time, or (b) create substantial danger of
undue prejudice or of confusing the issues
or of misleading the jury, or (c) unfairly
and harmfully surprise a party who has not
had reasonable opportunity to anticipate
that such evidence '10uld be offered.
nr0virler1.

thp

-8-
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State v. Chesnut, Utah, 621 P. 2d 1228 ( 1980), set
forth the appropriate standard of review for claims of
improper restriction of the right of cross-examination:
Since the trial court undulv restricted
rlefenclant in the exercise of his
constitutional right of cross-examination,
the review thereof is controlled by the
constitutional harmless error standard of
Chapman v. California. This standard
compels reversal unless the reviewing
court can declare a belief that the error
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt
[Footnote omitted].
Id. at 1233.

Not all constitutional errors, nor all

restrictions of a defenclant's right of cross-examination,
however, impair the defendant's cause to the extent requiring
reversal.

The United States Supreme Court, in Chapman v.

California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), stated:
We conclude that there may be some
constitutional errors which in the setting
of a particular case are so unimportant
and insignificant that they may,
consistent with the Federal Constitution,
be deemed harcless, not requiring the
automatic re~ersal of the conviction.
Id. at 2 2.

T'ie above statement 11as re-e1J1phas izec'! in "lr.

( 19 7 4) :
The Court holds that, in the circumstances
of this case, the Sixth and Fourteenth
A~en~~e~ts

co~~er~~~

tJ1e

right to cross-

examine a particular prosecution witness

-"-
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about his delinquency adjudication for
burglary and his status as a probationer.
Such cross-examination ~as necessary in
this case in order "to sho11 the existence
of possible bias and prejudice ,
,,"
ante, at 317.
In joining the Court's
opinion, I would emphasize that the Court
neither holds nor suggests that the
Constitution confers a right in every case
to impeach the general credibility of a
witness through cross-examination about
his past delinquency adjudications or
criminal convictions.
Id. at 321.
2d 202,

Also in agreement is State v. Scandrett, 24

Ut~

468 P.2d 639 (1970), where this Court stated:
There certainly are conceivable
circumstances where the violation of a
constitutional right could have no
possible bearing upon any unfairness or
imposition upon the defendant, or upon a
correct determination of his guilt or
innocence.
We think the correct view, and
the one which is both practical and in
keeping with the desired objective of
fundamental fairness and due process of
law, is that there is a presumption that
such error is prejudicial, but that it can
be overcome when the court is convinced
beyond- a reasonable doubt that it had no
such prejudicial effect upon the
proceedings.
Correlative to this it is
also true that when the guilt is shown by
other untainted evidence so overwhelming
t 1: 0 t:. 't 'r! e r r:? ~ r: -: ') , i 1:: e 1 ~- ~ 0 r'\~
~ ts 2-= ._-c :- o.:
a different result in the absence of such
error or irregularity, there should be no
reversal [Footnotes omitted].
\:

Id. at 643.
in the

.:-

Respondent submits that there are several

fac~r

instant case which, when considered in sum, establish

that the alleged error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt,
-10-
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The first of these factors involves the fact that
even if appellant was unable to fully explore the details of
the plea bargain Matheos made with the State by crossexamining Matheos, the matter had already been effectively
presented to the jury.

During direct examination Matheos

testified that he was originally a co-defendant in the case,
that he had been allowed to enter a plea of guilty to a lesser
included offense and that the plea bargain he had made with
the State would not influence his testimony:
Q.
Mr. Matheos, you were originally
charged as a co-defendant in the matter
presently before the Court, were you not?
A.

Yes, sir.

Q.
As a result of plea negotiations
between yourself and the State of Utah you
have been permitted to enter a plea of
guilty to a lesser included offense, have
you not?
A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

You have done so?

A.

Yes, sir.

Q.
Tell the Court and the jury if your
testimony here today is going to be based
upon the fact that you have just taken an
oath or upon any deal you have made with
the State of Utah?
THE COURT:
I don't think he understands.
You had better put that in Anglo-Saxon
English, Mr. Watson.

Q.

(By Mr. Watson) Is your testimony here
going to be the truth?

-11-
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A.

Yes, sir.

Q.
Is it going to be based upon your
observations made on the 20th of November,
1980?

A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

Is your testimony going to be
influenced in any fashion by the fact that
the State of Utah and you have made a deal
concerning the entry of plea in this
matter?
A.

(T. 67-68).

No, sir.
Because evidence of Matheos's involvement

int~

crime and the plea bargain entered into with the State had
already been presented to the jury for their consideration,
further questioning on the subject would have added little,
anything, to appellant's defense and would have constituted
the type of repetitive questioning which was recognized by
this Court as being a qualification or limitation of the

ri~

to cross-examine an adverse witness in State v. Chesnut, Utah
621 ?.2d 1228, 1233 (1980).

Impeachment evidence which is

merely cumulative to other impeachment evidence may be
pro::>erly excluded even if it is otherwise admissible.

State

v. Maestas, Utah, 564 P.2d 1386, 1389 (1977); State v.
Oniskor, 29 Utah 2d 395, 510 P.2d 929 (1973); People v. Bliss,
222 N.E.2d 57, 59 (Ill. App. 1966).
Second, appellant's questions on cross-examination
themselves, although unanswered,

implied appellant's

-12-
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contentions.
(1977),

In State v. Maestas, Utah, 564 P.2d 1386, 1388

this Court addressed the question of restriction of

cross-examination and made note of State v. Chance, 185 S.E.2d
227 (N.C. 1971), where the court found that the "defendant by
his question carried the full force and implication of his
contention."

Id. at 234.

In the instant case, the jury was

able to draw the intended inference as to Matheos 's past
criminal activity from the unanswered questions pertaining to
the number and nature of felonies for which he had previously
been convicted.

Thus appellant's contentions were adequately

presented to the jury and the lack of specific answers had no
significant detrimental effect on appellant's defense.
Third, at trial the State produced "evidence so
overwhelming that there is no likelihood whatsoever of a
different result in the absence of such error or
irregularity."
Oniskor,

Scandrett, supra, at 643; See also:

State v.

29 Utah'2d 395, 510 P.2d 929 (1973) at 931.

Notably,

appellant has not argued his innocence, nor challenged the
sufficiency of the evidence in this case.

.11.ppellant was not

convicted by virtue of Matheos's testimony alone.

Both the

teller and the manager at First Security Bank where appellant
uttered the forged check testified that appellant represented
himself to be "Roy Woodward."
itself,

In addition to the forged check

fingerprints lifted from the stolen checkbook from

:',ici-1 th"? forged check was taken matched appellant's.

This
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and other evidence produced at trial was sufficient, absent
Matheos's testimony,

to convict appellant.

Because of the

overwhelming evidence in this case, the alleged error fails,
provide a reasonable possibility that the outcome would have
been different.
Finally,

appellant has made no showing of how the
~

expected answers to the questions Matheos was not allowed
ans~er

would have bolstered his defense beyond what was

actually brought out, either directly or indirectly, before
the jury.
slight.

The benefit to appellant,

if any, would have been

The fact that the effect of the alleged error has no:

been adequately demonstrated suggests that the alleged error
was not prejudicial and had no significant effect on the
outcome of the trial.
During cross-examination appellant established

th~

Matheos had previously been convicted of a felony and that he
had Tade a deal with the State which was contingent upon his
testifying in this case.

The three specific areas of

ouestions t'iat appellant "'as not allowed to pursue on crossexamination were adequately adduced before the jury either
during direct examination by the State, or' indirectly by the
implications of appellant's questions themselves.

The above

facts, when considered in conjunction with the overwhelming
evidence other than Matheos 's testimony produced at trial, an:
t.:-.e :act that appellant h.c.s ::ot

lr.;r:tons~r-~~ted

how his cause ..'c:
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damaged by the alleged error, establish that the restriction
of cross-examination in this case was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt.

Appellant was effectively given the

opportunity to adduce before the jury facts sufficient to
support his contentions regarding Matheos's purported bias and
motive in testifying.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the conviction and
~

sentence should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted this

~day

19 82.

of July,

w

DAVID L. WILKINSON

At7Sk:T1J.

ROBERT N. PARRISH
Assistant Attorney General
CERTIFICATE OF

~AILING

I hereby certify that I mailed two true and exact
copies of the foregoing Brief, postage prepaid, to Shelden R.
Carter, Attorney fo;+Apellant, 350 East C:nter Street, Provo,
Utah, 84601, this

day of July, 1982.
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